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THE SOCIAL PROBLEM.¹

(CONCLUDED.)

WE HAVE now to recapitulate the principal propositions that flow from the developments which we have given in the preceding part of this discussion.²

(1) Nature is an unconscious mechanism ; she is indifferent to the phenomena which take place within her domain and to the creatures which live there ; and man is neither more nor less than other animals. But man happens to possess an advantage over animals, and from this superiority he derives all the benefit that he can. During the time that he lives, his concern for his conservation and happiness is his whole care. He has an ego which protects him against his own weaknesses, over which his reason and sentiment have not always full control. A very large number of his acts are unconscious. Society is a means of existence devised and exploited by man,—a means upon which he counts for increasing his power, for diminishing his sufferings, and for obtaining the greatest possible amount of satisfaction. Insensibly society has been transformed into a corporation which embraces both the present and the future.

(2) Societies have sprung from two sources : from the family, the members of which staid together ; and from indifferent assemblages, which were at first altruistic and were afterwards based on interest. External defence was the first stage ; internal defence the second. The progression was accomplished by force of circum-

¹ Translated from Dr. Topinard's MS. by T. J. McCormack.

² See the July *Monist*, pages 556-595.

stances without agreements of any kind. Contracts did not arise until later and then partly in consequence of some combat or crisis. Such was the case of the English barons and their followers forcing upon King John the Magna Charta of 1215, and such, too, was the case of the Pilgrims of Plymouth Rock in forming a constitution when they took possession of the land granted to them by James I. The "contract" of Spinoza and Rousseau is a mere theory, but nearer to the truth than the "living organism" of the positivists. In every democratic society there is a virtual pact of some kind between the two contracting parties: society has its duties to fulfil towards individuals, just as individuals have duties to fulfil towards society, or towards their fellow-beings—two equivalent terms, for society is the aggregate of one's fellow-beings. But to-day the contract tends to become more formal; the drift, now, is to submit not only the constitution but even the chief laws of the legislature to the sanction of a referendum.

(3) Societies have evolved empirically according to circumstances and individuals, or, to use a phrase of the day, according to the principle of *laissez aller*. Individuals, by nature very different, have played their part conformably to their special organisations, the strongest causing all things to centre about their personal interests, a small number only zealous for the interests of all. The results in different directions have thus only feebly responded to the end for which society was established, and if among these results selection, which operates with things as well as with animals, has made for the profit of the most prosperous societies, the reason for it is that nature never loses control of her rights, and always gives her sanction and justification to the most powerful.

Among these results there are many that are good. These are, for example: that permanent form of association, lasting from generation to generation, analogous to a stock-company, which compels the society to shape its action with regard to the future as well as the present of the species; the hereditary capital which is its result, which is exploited for the greatest welfare of all, and the profits of which must therefore be distributed with equity; the softening of manners; the pleasures of the intellect, reckoned

among the most desirable of superfluous needs ; in fact everything which may be recapitulated in the phrase "the progress of civilisation."

But there are evil results, too. For example, that horrible militarism to which external defence still forces us, and which, when war breaks out destroys at a blow all notions of morality. Then that internal scourge which comes from the results of the struggles of ancestors being perpetuated among their descendants, and from our being responsible not for our own conduct, but for that of our forefathers. Next the division of society into strata, the higher enjoying from birth a position and wealth which exempt them from all effort, the lower frequently conquered before they have fought, and predestined to misery and suffering. I have already spoken at sufficient length of the condition of the lower classes. I will but add a word. Whilst among the favored classes the family is the sanctuary and the focus of all joys, among the proletarians of Europe it has been almost totally obliterated. The father and mother labor, each in his sphere ; the latter is unable to give to her child that initial education which is so decisive for the whole of life ; frequently she is obliged to place her child in a foundling asylum ; the boys and girls of more advanced age are scattered in the workshops, or roam the streets exposed to all sorts of bad examples and temptations ; even at night they scarcely come together and make the acquaintance of their domestic hearth.

(4) The method of life in common was adopted by man with a view to increasing his means of action, and affording to his faculties the fullest capacities of development in the direction which claims his nearest interests. He seeks in this way to free himself from the performance of certain general services which naturally fall to the lot of all, and which would distract him from his immediate occupations. He desires to work out his own happiness in his own way, to be responsible for his acts, and also to enjoy the fruits of his responsibility. Society, therefore, is bound to allow him a maximum of liberty in order that he may have a maximum return ; its reason for being would be annulled if the individual were lessened by the social state.

(5) Now it is by competition or struggle alone that the individual achieves his fullest value and finds the employment in which his faculties are best utilised. It is in struggle that the higher individual variations of which we have spoken find their fullest expansion, and that the mean variations, and possibly also some of the lowest, are either heightened or are put to use under conditions which are suitable to them. Society cannot think for a moment of eradicating struggle. From its own point of view as desiring the welfare of all, or as a commercial and industrial association working a capital and obligated to declare dividends, it ought even to encourage it. The over-production of all things necessary to material life, to welfare, and to intellectual enjoyments, which are the result of the labor of individuals, redounds to the profit of the whole social mass. The activity engendered by the struggle, selection wanting, is the agent which perfects the species. Hitherto that activity was restricted to certain classes, the lower had few needs and produced nothing beyond what was actually necessary. Now this activity is extended; every one wishes to have his share of the superfluous satisfactions. We have seen that it is not absolutely certain that intelligence has increased since antiquity; the reason for this probably is that this activity was partial and poorly directed. To-day, when it is becoming general and is growing in quantity, it is impossible not to encourage it. Struggle, of which the results are no longer sanguinary, but lead to more or less welfare and satisfaction according to the activity employed, is the highest necessity both for the individual and society.

6. There are philanthropists who would replace struggle with peace and universal fraternity. Instead of the formula of physiological justice,—viz., “to each one according to his faculties, his deserts, and his works,” three synonymous terms as here used,—they say, with their metaphysical conception of absolute justice, “to every one according to his needs,” that is to say: to the indolent, lazy individual who shirks work, as much as to the active, useful individual who produces more than he needs, who, it is true, enriches himself but at the same time enriches the mass of his fellow-beings. This would be absolute hypothetical justice,

clashing with the only demonstrated justice, the only one having a claim to the title of natural justice. For these philanthropists the ideal of society is that of a great family of which the members are closely joined and solidary, as in completely unified animal colonies, enjoy all their liberties without restraint, share all things with all, live each according to his own tastes, and satisfy all alike their immediate and superfluous desires, all the peers of the others. But this programme is self-contradictory in certain of its parts, and it is contradictory to nature, the individual, and the social idea itself. It is a Utopia impossible to realise even in the most distant future, and as a whole not even desirable. It is equality pure and simple. Establish it, and in a month, in a day, in an hour, it will no longer exist. In a word, what here around me in the schools of jurisprudence is called the moral law is contradictory to the law of nature and but a fiction, a generous conception of our cerebral sensibility.

7. We have not yet stated our conclusions regarding the questions which were mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, but they are suggested in so forcible a manner that the reader has himself doubtless formulated them a score of times. The realities of nature and the necessities of life in common are irreconcilable if we refuse to see things as they really are and if we seek to model practice on absolute conceptions which have no basis but desire, sentiment, and imagination. The individual, unmodified by habits or impulses more or less unconscious, but left to his own nature and controlled only by his animal ego, recognises only his own interest and craves for liberty pure and undiminished. Society is a complexus of concessions to the common cause. The individual grants these concessions to society and keeps his contracts, but only so long as he finds profit in it, or because he is not the strongest. Whenever he reasons coolly, where there is no outlook for punishment, where there is no fear of opinion, nor of the mediate or remote effect of his conduct, his animal and egoistic nature appears. Society can only master him by force, and discipline him like a soldier in an army.

But the realities of nature and the exigencies of society admit of easy reconciliation if instead of dashing ourselves to pieces on

the two rocks of animality and the absolute, we steer between them; when we submit to accepting what we cannot avoid, for example, the organic and intellectual inequality of men and the absence of real justice; and if we do not lose from sight the definition of Montesquieu: "Laws are the necessary relations that are derived from the nature of things." This means that rules and laws, being the sanction of the best possible relations between individuals and society, should not be left to the mercy of empiricism, the caprice of a monarch, of a multitude, or of any form of universal suffrage; that they should be dictated by reason after light has been received from all possible sources; that between all the solutions which present themselves there is one which is best adapted to existing conditions and is the necessary relation sought. Jean Jacques Rousseau has defined law to be "the expression of the general will." This is not more exact than if we said, "of the will of a monarch or of a parliament"; for will may be poorly illuminated, blind, unintelligent, passionate, and in disaccord with utility as rightly understood. The "necessary relation" of Montesquieu can be determined only by a perfect knowledge of the subject by men who are carefully prepared, independent, and animated by a holy love for humanity, by men who will apply their best intelligence to seeking the solution of each problem duly studied, who will weigh the *pros* and *cons*, the advantages and drawbacks in each case,—by men versed in social science and its different branches, notably the science of law.

Evolution left to itself has yielded, as we see, both good and bad results. The latter must be amended, even if we must go to the quick. It is incumbent on man to take matters in hand himself and to direct their course. He knows the difficulties to be overcome, he knows what he has to renounce and what he has hope of obtaining. The human species in its duel with other species and with nature has won many victories. Man has but to continue his conquests and to introduce into his efforts method and logical consequence; he has found a way of appropriating certain of the forces of nature, of adapting numerous vegetable and animal species to his wants. It is impossible to suppose that he is not capable of

organising a society as he judges best and, if necessary, of transforming sufficiently his own nature.

* * *

Let us pass to the applications, in broad outlines. We will suppose a society at the stage at which our present civilisations are, of the average size, and democratic; we shall not consider others. We leave aside the United States, which was founded and developed under exceptionally favorable conditions, which did not possess the fixed routine of Europe, which adopted, at a single stroke, communal autonomy and the autonomy of states, and which is only faulty in point of federation, in embracing too many different regions, and too many dissimilar interests. What would be the functions of such a society, and what would be its attitude towards those for whose greatest happiness it was created?

The first thing which it must bear in mind is that the total mass, the general interest, alone exists for it; that the parts of this mass, the particular interests, figure only through the part which they take in the general functioning of society, and that individuals are molecules only in the pseudo-organism which it is called upon to direct. This is the principle of the unity of state, and the only way to comprehend the "Reason of State" and the Secret Funds which are admitted in very exceptional cases, in the present state of things, for the public safety. The members of the parliaments, whatever be the manner, felicitous or unfelicitous, in which they are appointed, represent the country in its entirety and not any particular circumscribed part of it. Their lot is to pass general laws which apply to the needs of the mass without stopping to consider exceptional individual cases. When their duty is accomplished, which is to grant equality to all before the law, and, more exactly, equality of advantages and disadvantages resulting from necessary laws,—they can only submit to the inevitable injustices which they here and there produce. Thousands of innocent human beings are sacrificed in case of war, and in the interior of the state, too, there are untold necessary victims of the universality of laws. The legislator has an enormous responsibility. What he decides should be accounted infallible, although he may be in error.

He must act for the best, knowing that he cannot attain perfection, however much he may be inspired with ideal conceptions. But what he should also never lose sight of is that each of the persons under his administration has in himself the sentiment of relative justice of which we have spoken, of "that which is his due," and that this justice implies the natural right to insurrection inscribed in the declaration of the rights of man a century ago.

The functions of the state are divided into essential and facultative, the first falling under three heads: (1) external defence; (2) internal defence; (3) general services.

External defence. This is of two kinds: military and economical. The former gave rise to the first societies, which for a long time remained at this stage. Unfortunately its counterpart followed—attack and then conquest. Militarism resulted, becoming a need, a passion for domination, for rapine and glory, growing worse with time and falsifying the entire mechanism of society. Even to-day it is the greatest obstacle to the serious progress of humanity. So long as the ethics practised in time of war is so violently opposed to the ethics professed in time of peace, it will be impossible to inculcate in the minds of individuals that there is but one ethics. And yet militarism is a necessary evil which we cannot avoid, a devouring cancer which we cannot cure. The first need of a nation is to defend itself and to make itself respected, in order to live. War absorbs the best wealth of a country, it decimates it, it leaves behind it nothing but ruin, it makes of man a ferocious beast. Yet despite it all, we must be ready for it. On the fatal day all the members of a society are here solidary; all devote themselves as a mass to the common safety. The state, even in time of peace, has an army to support; vessels, cannons, munition, ports, fortifications, strategic roads, hospitals, special schools, an entire administration to create, watch over, and recompense. This function alone, bearing as it does upon a large number of points, requires a complete centralisation and alone absorbs a great part of the action of the state, gives to it an excessive influence and enables it to mingle in the life of individual interests more than the principle allows. By its budget it weighs down heavily upon the nation; by its ob-

ligatory service in countries which from their geography have no natural defence, it turns from life at the decisive moment of existence the whole able-bodied masculine population. Militarism is the worst of scourges but a necessity of the times, to which we must submit.

But there is not only the war with cannons. There is another species of warfare, which has been termed peaceful, and which is conducted by its side. The extension of exchange, the facility of communications, has in modern times swollen it to such proportions that the state has been obliged to interfere and to protect its members. Economical, commercial, and industrial competition between individuals has overflowed the frontiers of nations and become international. If we consider the general interest of humanity alone the system of protection against other countries is wrong. Free exchange, the free circulation of the means of existence, drawn as water in communicating vessels to the places where they are scarcest, is the true law. When a country does not produce these means of existence, or does not produce them in the desired form as regards cheapness and quantity, it is reasonable not only that it should accept them from its neighbors, but also that it should demand them, and that in return it should furnish to them what it produces cheaply and abundantly. Protection is a device for forcing a country to be self-supporting and for creating industries of its own, for it is undesirous of being tributary to foreign markets. The reasoning is correct from a national point of view, but it proves that the sacrifices for the general welfare which society exacts of individuals in its own sphere are refused for the common welfare of humanity. It is always the question of the two schemes of ethics—one for ourselves and one for others. But there are products which one does not possess at all and for which we must have recourse to others. The United States are a new country, rich in mines of all kinds, capable of producing everything of which its people have need. They may permit themselves the luxury of dispensing with the rest of the world, for they are in the highest sense a social joint stock company. But in Europe the situation is different. The various states are obliged to supplement one another. England in its

insular condition has long since learned that it cannot with its agriculture contend on an equal footing with the remaining world and that it is obliged perforce to become industrial, trading, and distributive, as were formerly the Phœnicians, the Genoese, and the Dutch. It is in its proper sphere. But is it not incumbent also on the other peoples of Europe to band together, and upon this basis to take the first step towards the United States of Europe? At present societies protect themselves by the aid of export and import bounties, subsidisation of merchant marines, instructions to consuls, and especially by the aid of treaties which the Powers wrangle over exactly as individuals do.

But if rival societies have hostile interests, fortunately they have also common interests, and here there is ground for understanding, which is destined, we are convinced, to assume greater and greater proportions. From this arises a host of treaties of all sorts regarding postal communications, weights and measures, money, literary property, the extradition of criminals, the establishment of sanitary regulations, and so forth. The sphere of jurisdiction of the state is, therefore, even thus far and for exterior affairs already considerable. In France, if we deduct the interest of the national debt, the budget of the exterior is alone one-half of the total budget.

Defence of the interior.—This is the second function of the state—the defence of individuals against one another, against the causes of interior calamity, and against themselves.

The first outweighs the others. It is the protection of individuals who restrict themselves absolutely to the exercise of their recognised rights and observe the laws, against those who violate these rights, trespass upon those of others, and break the laws. It embraces assault, material obstruction of one's actions, slander, etc., infringement of property rights and of the right to labor, the violation of contracts duly attested, etc. One of the sacrifices imposed upon the individual being to refrain from administering justice himself, save in cases of self-defence, society is obliged to discharge for him this function in some manner.

The second class of measures for interior defence is concerned

with salubrity and embraces measures for the prevention of diseases of men, useful animals, and plants. The third class is concerned with the protection, in exceptional cases, of the individual against himself. Evidently the individual is master of all of his acts which concern only himself; he may even commit suicide. But when he is obliged to apply to professions whose practice requires special knowledge and ability, of which he is not capable of being a judge, and which may have the gravest consequences, surely the state should come to his help and protect him against his own ignorance. Such professions are those of medicine and pharmacy, of law, of navigation, and even of civil engineering and architecture. The practice of these professions must be sanctioned by certificates or diplomas, awarded, or at least stamped, by the state. Probably the day will come when the public will not be deluded by sensational advertising and charlatanism, but that day is still far distant.

The economical protection which we saw at work abroad has its complement in the interior of the state; the one brings the other in its train,—both are to be regretted. Bounties are granted here and there for supporting national competition,—in France, for example, upon sugars and silks.

By the side of these is seen another species of economical protection which is absolutely condemnable, and which cannot be explained except by the personal bias and interests of legislators which ought never to exist. I refer to the special protection of some one industry, some one region, some one group, or even some one class. It rises from the arbitrary and unequal imposition of taxes, made either through partiality or ignorance.

This brings us to the reverse aspect of the protection of individuals, to the total abstention of the state from everything which constitutes a private act, from everything which bears upon the normal course of life, and to that fierce struggle which must leave individuals to their own risks and perils.

In the face of that struggle, which we have shown to be at once legitimate and necessary from the triple point of view of progress broadly viewed, of society considered as the administrator of the common capital and the distributor of its dividends, and of the

individual seeking to exercise all his faculties and to bear the responsibility of all his acts; in the face of this struggle, in which the result is no longer selection by death but the need of enjoyment and the desire for a better position in life,—a struggle of which the effect is to disengage the higher individual variations for the general profit of the whole social mass and to furnish that employment which accords best with the average and lower variations,—in the face of this struggle, I say, the attitude of the social body is distinctly marked: absolute neutrality, the awarding to every one of a full recompense for his efforts and the leaving to him of all the consequences of his failures, however they may have come about. Relative individual justice requires this; the intermeddling of the state in the struggle would be injustice. Men are unequal by the fault of nature; society has simply to bow to the fact; all that it can do is to seek to render the combat loyal and courteous, and if possible to prevent the conqueror from absolutely crushing and destroying the conquered. Without detriment to the principle of non-intervention, it may also prohibit the struggle on the part of those who are plainly without arms, and to prepare for it those who are not so. Let me explain myself.

Society should have asylums for idiots and the insane, for congenital cripples and non-developed children. It should gather under its paternal care foundlings and orphans, assume charge of and prepare for life during the necessary period of time the children of fathers and mothers who are incapable of fulfilling this task. What it should do or seek to do is, above all, to equalise as much as possible the external conditions of the combat at the start. It is customary in a duel for the adversaries to have the same arms, the same kind of ground, the same clothing as nearly as possible, the same kind of shoes, etc. The rest is left to the valor and skill of the combatants. It should be the same in the social struggle. Birth places the combatants in very different positions: the one has capital, property, education, rank; the other has none; the one has all the chances of conquering; the other all the chances of being conquered. In a word, the sons are not exclusively responsible for their own acts; they are responsible for their fathers' and

ancestors', and for the situation in which the latter have left them. This is a monstrosity,—that which from the beginning of society has weighed down the most on evolution, as we know. But, it will be said, this is attacking inheritance, consequently the family, the right of every one to labor for his children, which is one of the most powerful main-springs of human activity. Unquestionably and precisely it is an instance of the impossibility of reconciling everything. Whatever may be the solution, justice is wrecked on the one side or on the other. There is no amelioration possible except by adopting a middle course: suppress all inheritance *ab intesta* outside of direct ascendants and descendants and of the wife and husband, that is, outside of the immediate family, and restrict in the same sense the right of testamentary disposition. Bequeathable property would revert to the state and enable the state to abolish all taxes which now press so heavily on the labor of men in society.

General services.—The department of general services is the third essential function of the state. Everything which requires the co-operation of all, upon which it would be difficult to come to an understanding, or which would divert the individual from his personal occupations implies a central direction and is the province of the state. In truth, all the functions of the state fall under this last category, excepting war, where every one may be put in urgent requisition. Such are the preparation for war itself, the exterior economical defence, the interior defence with its three principal forms, with its two organisations of police and justice, education and public aid, of which we will soon speak.

The general services to which we refer at present are highways, canals, railways, not connected with war but with the internal prosperity, with the transportation of the means of subsistence and of travellers, the postal and telegraph service, depots and markets, forests and parks reserved for general recreation, although collaterally exploited for the needs of the state, and finally the finances, which we meet with everywhere and which are the contribution of each to the common expenses, being essentially (1) a fixed part, equal for all, the non-payment of which brings on the loss of the

advantages connected with the rank of citizen ; (2) a supplementary part proportional to the successes won in the struggle and to the enjoyments obtained,—that is, to one's fortune.

These services are of two kinds : the first are permanent in character and require a corps of employees of different grades, which constitutes properly the administration ; the second are intermittent and are evoked by the occasions of the moment ;—they may be let out by private contract, at auction, by governmental concessions, and by franchises, etc. The latter have the greatest possible extension. The rule is that the state should never compete with private enterprise, and that it should always have recourse to it unless there is some serious objection. The state, however, is responsible ; in principle it performs the work, it directs its course, supervises its execution, even when it avoids direct participation. It has been proved, furthermore, that work undertaken directly by the state is more onerous, requires a longer time for its completion, and is generally less thoroughly performed ; the responsibility of the state is too widely divided, or rather it is only nominal : its employees have not a personal interest in doing their work better—they take no serious risk. The work of man receives its value from the prospective remuneration, proportionate to the care which he bestows upon it, and to the perils which he fears. The proletarian who works by the day or the year does not labor as the individual does who is responsible to himself, who follows his own ideas, who knows that he has chances of losing as well as of gaining and that the good as well as the bad outcome of his labors depends upon his personal attention and activity.

The three functions of the state which we have just recapitulated, concerning especially actual individuals, are strictly speaking the only ones which are obligatory. But the state, being a permanent body having a paternal supervision over the welfare of its members, and being under obligation to look out for the morrow, an irresistible drift has extended its field of action for the better or for the worse. The material which we have to examine falls under two headings.

COMPASSION is the first. It is the sentiment of pity which so-

ciety is supposed to feel for those who suffer through its fault, or through the fault of nature. Society, strictly speaking, is not justified in this feeling : first, because not having a right to interfere in the consequences of the normal struggle between individuals or to modify personal responsibility, it is bound to abstain ; secondly, because to interfere with those consequences and with responsibility is to attack the stimulus to all activity and all progress, and so to run counter to all that goes to the making of wealth ; thirdly, because, if the individual has a nervous system and an apparatus of sensibility which moves him to make a matter of sentiment out of his risks and perils, to represent to himself the sufferings of others and to act as if he felt them himself, society possesses no such organisation. Society is comparable to an employee charged with a certain labor to perform, or to a manager of a business who has to think only of the dividends to be distributed,—it reasons only with figures and cannot yield to the stirrings of the heart.

Nevertheless, the fact cannot be disguised that if a community is comparable to a stock company administering a capital in the name of its stockholders, it can also be compared to a society for protection and assurance against the risks of nature. If the strong seek to lord it over the weak, the latter demand protection ; the strong and young of to-day may be the weak of to-morrow and the old man of the day after to-morrow. When fathers expect children, are they certain that the latter will be favored by nature? Does not disease attack all? Therefore it is to the general interest to insure against the unknown, and nature being wanting, for society to assume the functions of providence. Furthermore, the sentiment of compassion is so imbedded in the heart of man that no voice is raised in opposition when assistance is made one of the accessory functions of society. The only difficulty is the exact measure to be meted out, a measure which it is difficult to fix as a general rule. The first consideration is not to give to the vanquished the joys to which they have not a right, and not to strip the vanquishers of the entire satisfaction of victory. Permanent or passing aid must not be converted into an encouragement to idleness or a premium upon vagabondage. We said just above that society should witness im-

passively the struggle between individuals, as did the heralds of the Middle Ages ; that it should see to it that every one on his entrance into the arena has fair and equal outward chances, but that it must be able, like the Cæsars at Rome, to stop the final and useless massacre of the vanquished. The doctrine of compassion would authorise society to do more ; it would suffer her to nurse the wounded, to assuage the suffering of adversaries put *hors de combat*. It follows that the department of public aid so-called, that is to say, of hospitals for the sick and homes for adults,—for we are not speaking here of children, idiots, insane persons, and cripples,—for civil and military invalids, for widows and paupers in given cases, are legitimate. And yet, as we said in a previous chapter, many among those assisted will remark : “ Why then save and work for more than our immediate needs if our morrow is assured ? ” I do not speak of vagabonds or tramps or of mendicants by profession ; with these it is necessary to deal severely. “ The benevolent action of charity can only be compared to the harm that it does,” says M. Émile Chevallier.¹ Aid is not a personal right for any individual,—this must be impressed upon the mind,—but a disgrace for the person who is the object of it. Every hand extended, every succor received, saving certain well-established exceptions, must be considered as a disgrace, must implicate the loss of civil rights lasting until rehabilitation. To reconcile all this, we shall recapitulate as follows : it is true, succor must be extended to the unfortunate, the old, the infirm, the vanquished in the struggle for existence, those whom circumstances and their natural inferiority rather than their conduct have ruined, those whom wounds have prematurely rendered unfit for the arena ; but the succor should be given with discernment day by day and be reduced to a minimum ; it should be given after inquiry, in just the necessary amount and no more. Since compassion, which nature does not possess, and individual justice, which requires that each should bear the conse-

¹ Emile Chevallier. *La loi sur les pauvres et la société anglaise. Couronné par l'Institut.* Paris, 1895.

quences, bad or good, of his acts, are contradictory, therefore compassion should not be made a clog upon justice.

There are two systems of charity : one administered by the state ; and one by private persons or associations. The two may be administered simultaneously : the first in incontestable cases—cases of the infirm and the insane without support ; the second in cases which are more doubtful—as the case of those who have fallen in the struggle, etc. But there is a remark to be made with respect to state charity. Every time a supplementary function is added to the work of the state, the money always comes from the pockets of the tax-payers, and it is in reality they who perform the service. The question comes back therefore to this : will the state distribute its aid better than private persons or corporations? In the first case it is naturally the function of the county, township, or parish, and not of the central authority.

PROGRESS is the second supplementary function of the state. In this point of view and as the heir of a physical, intellectual, and moral patrimony, from which all its members draw and which it must transmit, augmented and bettered, to posterity, society has several questions to consider. Should it, or should it not, look with favor upon the increase of its population? Should it stimulate individuals to advance in the path which sociologists declare the best for multiplying its power of production and for most justly distributing the fruits which flow therefrom? Should it endeavor to modify its customs in the most favorable direction, in the direction which gives the most satisfaction under the conditions of life in common? Should it seek to impress a definite direction upon the best habits of society, upon character, upon manners of feeling, thinking, and acting? And, in such a case, what shall be the means employed? Shall they be employed directly or indirectly, and upon what shall they be based?

The answer to the first question is not ambiguous in the present state of Europe ; men are necessary for defence. But suppose war should be abolished : then an excessive population would be a drawback ; men, all other things being equal, will, in a given space of territory, be happier when their number is small than when it is

large. With regard to the other questions there is much to say. I shall take but a few examples.

The right of assembling together, the right of association which flows from it, are among the rights which the French Revolution regarded as inalienable. They have given birth to society itself. It would be strange if men could not band together now as they did for the first time and under the same influences—common interest and sometimes sympathy. In our day the principle of association has been considerably extended and is the force from which the future has to expect the greatest beneficence. There are commercial associations of a small number of responsible members or of an unlimited number of mere stockholders with responsibility limited to their holdings; industrial associations for protection, circulation, or consumption; political, scientific, and religious associations; professional syndicates of employers or workingmen, associations for education, charity, sport; and hundreds of others having the most varied objects. Some are mere instruments in the struggle for existence, employed by individuals, with which the state has nothing to do but which it generally must know of, so as to assure itself that their doings are not in violation of its laws. The others have for their object various public utilities, for which the state, if these associations were lacking, would have to care,—associations which consequently a state has the best reason to encourage. Every liberty, in fine, should be granted to associations, which are a form of progress, provided they infringe in no way upon the recognised liberty of individuals. In the eye of the state they are simply collective individuals having the same rights and the same duties as single individuals.

A serious question, however, presents itself. The individual is the present social difficulty, the enemy to be adapted to the necessary customs, the element of revolt which is always disposed to substitute its own personality for that of the state. We have seen that society, in consequence of its obligation to restrict itself absolutely to the interests of its clients, is possessed, as its international relations demonstrate, of a cold, calculating, and mathematical character, of an intellectual egoism far more stern than that of the

individual, because it is not tempered by the rational sensibility of the latter. History shows the excesses which may result from it when authority is centred in the hands of one man. If this axiom is no longer manifested in our democracies it is because society is in our day public property, the aggregate of its citizens, who, though scattered and segregated in infinite ways, watch it and prevent it from transcending the proper measure. What will our great syndical associations of individuals become in the future? Are they approaching to the type of social egoism, or to the type of individual egoism. May they not in certain circumstances, as in the case of strikes and workingmen's unions which embrace both hemispheres, become a menace at once to society and to the individual? Instead of contending with the individual who is still easily guided by sentiments and even by pretentious words, society will have to do battle with compact bodies of individuals who have but one dominating guide—the absolute necessity of its nameless and irresponsible members. I have been a close observer of their doings. They commit sometimes collectively and with calm deliberation monstrous acts of which their members individually would disapprove, for the responsibility falls on no one in particular. The most moral being, despite the picture which we have drawn of him, is the individual, and that for reasons which I shall give later. Associations are less moral. The state would be even less moral than associations, were it not for public opinion and the fear of revolutions. And why? Because the individual alone has a sensibility which at times neutralises egoism, whilst syndical associations have the same egoism without anything to offset it.

Among associations there are some which merit particular attention: commercial associations for aiding and succoring individuals and "mutual" associations for the same purpose. They are concerned on one hand with saving, and on the other with insuring the individual and his family against disease, loss of employment, accidents, and all the other unknown possibilities of the morrow. Saving and insurance are the expression of a quality, foresight, which some animal species possess in the highest degree and others not at all, which the lowest human species do not possess, which

among civilised men is more or less developed, and which people are unanimous in regarding as one of the characteristics of the Celtic race (the brachycephalic of western and central Europe). This quality is certainly one of those which are most physiological and contributes, consequently, the most towards the personal happiness of the individual. It flows from the idea that the existence of every person embraces three periods: one of preparation, one of work, and one of rest. And that in this last period where the physical and intellectual faculties are reduced in power, the first necessity is not to be dependent upon the care of any one, not to be left to the mercy of any of those numerous reverses from which the bravest and strongest are not exempt in the struggle for existence, and never to have recourse to private or public charity. It accords with the desire for stability and for the enjoyment of the fruits of life in the environment in which one is born, the enjoyment of a home, which is opposed diametrically to the spirit of Bohemian unrest which tends to become general in the closing days of our century and is the source of so many evils. Evidently society should look with favor upon the practice of saving, of acquiring annuities for life, *pensions de retraite*, upon the establishment of combinations for guaranteeing dowries to young women, competencies to young men beginning life, and provisions for widows and orphans. We say that the state owes protection to children, to the crippled for life, to all whose parents fail in their duty to them prior to the period when they are competent to manage their own affairs. But it really falls to the lot of associations for mutual aid to include within their sphere of action the care of children. They look now-a-days to the needs of adults, but they should also think of the needs of the children and the adolescent. The more the state shows itself to be intractable in the matter of compassion, the more these associations will develop in this direction as well as in others. M. Chevallier in the work cited above shows that the great extension of societies for mutual aid in England took place subsequently to the revised Paupers' Law of 1834, that this law rendered the workhouses generally detested, and that the workingman was in this way brought to the desire to protect himself. He shows

also that home assistance furnished by the state hindered the development of providential societies, all of which is a repetition of the truth that the state should encourage such things but should directly interfere as little as possible.

There is a quality inherent in the human race, almost the exact reverse of the preceding, which society should also favor, not for the interest of the individual as above, but for its own general interest. It is distinctly marked in the Anglo-Saxon races, and consists not in placing one's savings aside so as to be able to draw therefrom interest, dividends, or security for the morrow, but directly to cause them to multiply by more or less boldness. It is the spirit of enterprise, symbolised in the saying "go ahead." Its drawback sometimes is the accumulation of too great wealth in the same hands and thus the furnishing of a foundation for all the objections which are raised to-day against capitalism. Its advantage is the increasing of the circulation of wealth, the affording to it greater chances for distribution among the more active laborers and the producing of the means of existence and the objects of comfort in large quantities from which all cheaply profit. We will not insist upon this subject, which borders upon struggle, activity in general and its rewards, of which we have spoken sufficiently. There is no doubt but society should look upon all such efforts with favor and should encourage all initiative in directions which may give profit to all.

Another direction which should be encouraged is the development of the intellectual faculties, the preference for pleasures of a higher order and consequently the raising of the level of the human species more and more above that of other animals. We speak of the sciences, of arts and letters, and of their applications, whatever be their kind and degree. And this leads us to education.

Education has two objects. The first is to shape the character of the generation which is entering upon active life, to discover and to develop the aptitudes which children possess. We shall see later what is to be thought of the second object. In virtue of the principle that the state should not interfere in things which individuals are willing to do, education should be free. But its duty is

to encourage in that way all private efforts, to watch it carefully, and to give its sanction to the certificates and diplomas which issue from it. We have seen that the state should take charge of abandoned children whose parents refuse to prepare them for the struggle of the future. Whether given by the family, by private institutions, or by the state, directly or indirectly, it is at the start obligatory primary instruction. It should aim chiefly to fashion the cerebral organ, to inculcate common sense, spirit, habits of observation and logical induction, ready memory, etc. At the second stage come the secondary schools of a general character, the different professional and special schools, access to which as the result of an examination revealing the inclinations of the scholar will be made easy by the state to children whose parents are unable to defray the expenses of tuition and maintenance. In the third stage, that of superior instruction, there must be also entrance examinations and also free tuition and support. The difficulty is to make families comprehend the obligation resting upon them of giving to their children the maximum education of which they are capable. With public opinion and some few inducements and expedients, this is not impossible. Why, in our elections, should not two votes be given to persons holding diplomas from the secondary schools, and three votes to the graduates of institutions of the highest grade? Why are not certain diplomas obligatory for filling governmental and administrative positions? Is not politics itself a science? The aim is that no child should be deprived of the means which are capable of emphasising and developing his natural aptitudes. The principle is that the state, without interfering with the rights of the family when the latter fulfils its duties, nevertheless owes protection to childhood, as later it is committed to neutrality towards the individual entering the arena. By a progressive artificial selection of the kind indicated above, society would procure the best and greatest possible returns from its population, with whose prosperity it is entrusted. The higher individual variations would come to the front; the mean variations would be enabled to display themselves in the best and most appropriate conditions; the lower vari-

ations for which there is no hope, would alone be sacrificed, but the emulation of the struggle would greatly diminish their number.

The complement of this education would be laboratories for original research, public museums and collections, a few very special superior schools, model farms, national manufactories, and lectures which I might style luxuries, and which in the American phraseology are said "not to pay," but which are yet absolutely necessary for societies that are anxious to hold their own in the steeple-chase of progress. The state, if it does not take upon itself its duties directly, should at least carefully see to it that they are fulfilled.

* * *

The second object of education implies a broader signification. It looks to the public morals and to individual habits of feeling, thinking, and acting, independently of the useful or disadvantageous effects which they may have, and of the pressure exercised by the laws. It is concerned with the external conditions which are to be adapted to human nature, or with those aspects of human nature which are to be adapted to social conditions, and has for its direct object the intrinsic progress both of society and of the species. Two systems here confront us. In the one, evolution is considered as always ending, after oscillations for good or for evil, in the best possible result, and is consequently abandoned to itself, that is, to the free play of individualities and of circumstances. It is the *laissez aller*. In the other, evolution is considered as not giving desirable results and as requiring, therefore, guidance toward the end to be attained—the greatest happiness distributed among mankind in the most equitable manner. This is the system of interference.

And this brings us to the ego whose history we have traced in describing the individual at pages 562–566 of *The Monist* for July, 1898. In every individual, as we have endeavored to show, conduct is the outcome of three factors. The first is the ego which is inherent in the animal and exists in man as in all animals,—with this difference that man having more intelligence, this ego assumes in him a high authority. It is the guide and guardian of the individual, it

has no object but the needs of the individual and their satisfaction, it is devoted entirely to these objects, it is egoism incarnate. This is the animal ego which we have portrayed in such sombre colors. The second factor is the product of habits of feeling, thinking, and acting as they are formed in ancestors and bequeathed to the individual in the shape of predispositions, which when confronted with conditions similar to those which have engendered them, are appropriately developed and have a weighty influence on the acts of the individual. This is the ancestral ego. The third is the product of the habits of the individual himself, acquired during infancy and the course of his life, depending on the maternal and primary education, on the comrades with whom he has associated, upon the examples which have been set him, upon the methods of feeling and thinking to which he has abandoned himself, upon the ideas which he has formed, and the allurements which they involve. This is the acquired individual ego. It also has a profound influence upon the acts of his life.

The animal ego reduced to itself is all-powerful in its activity, but its interference is not obligatory, as has already been said ; it is optional ; it is affected when the attention of the ego is sufficiently aroused and when the ego is resolved to have full sway. The two other egos, on the contrary, are passive. An excitation arrives at the cerebral centre, awakens these egos, and brings about the reflex action which it has already produced. Combined they constitute the unconscious ego which answers spontaneously to the demands of the individual when the real or conscious ego is not moved to intervene. The conduct of man, neglecting the purely medullary reflexes, is the outcome now of the one and now of the other. The conscious ego is the author of reasoned and directly willed acts, the unconscious ego is the source of instinctive and more or less spontaneous acts which are termed "impulses."

But the peripheral excitation which has reached the brain does not always directly awaken there the motor reaction ; it also awakens the sentiments and ideas which hereditary habit and acquired individual habit have established in previous periods, together with the entire network of thought which is attached to it. Little as the

conscious ego occupies itself with what takes place in this labyrinth, still the sentiments and the ideas awakened, arouse of themselves the acts which are in habitual correlation with them, acts which even the conscious ego, if it were in full possession of itself, would probably never have committed. Thus a host of actions are explained, which society regards as proper or deserving, and which are yet in disaccord with the reasoned interests of the individual,—among them being acts of self-denial, generosity, and devotion.

Now of what are the ancestral ego and the individual ego which mutually strengthen each other, the outcome? Of modes of living and instruction, of impulses in ancestors and in the individual, which can be governed, evoked, and created. The animal ego knows but one thing—itsself, its interests, and its pleasures; the acquired ego acts as it has been in the habit of acting, and as it has been taught. The first calculates, the second obeys automatically. The first has its roots in the physiology of the organism and is incorrigible. The second can be moulded, adapted to social needs, and trained to feel and to think as the general welfare requires. The results of education, taken in its broadest sense, are brought to bear upon the acquired ego from the first generation, when it was formed, but more so upon those which follow where the same education is repeated, and where heredity comes to its assistance.

The ways and the means remain. In the first rank appears education by the family, its basis being respect for ancestors, veneration of their memory, and the meritorious examples which are to be cited from this source. The natural rôle of the mother is to form the heart, that of the father to shape the intellect by implanting in it the necessary notions of the reciprocal duties of men in society, of obedience to laws, of the responsibility of every one for his acts, of the obligation of every person to carve out his own destiny,—in fine everything which is indispensable to the existence of life in common. Upon this chapter of the family we should have much to say; we should have to recall all that we have seen of this subject among animals and at the dawn of human society. The problem of woman at the present day would be added. We should have to place in the foreground the Anglo-American movements

for her emancipation and the ideas which *The Monist* has somewhere characterised as French, regarding her rôle as a guardian of the domestic hearth, as a conservator of altruistic sentiments, and as the educator *par excellence* of children. We should have to ask which of these opposing evolutions are best qualified to lead humanity to happiness, and whether we should in our desires prefer the point of view of nature or the point of view of philanthropy. But this would require much space, and the subject deserves its own separate and full treatment.

In the second place comes the education which falls without the sphere of the family and is affected by the environment ; that is, on the one hand by companions, examples, the conditions in which one lives, the allurements to which one is subjected ; and on the other by the school, the books and the magazines which one spontaneously reads. It is undoubted that at the start primary instruction should not run counter to that of the family ; that on the contrary it should strengthen it ; that one should not make freethinkers of children prematurely ; and that without touching the liberty of conscience, one should inculcate in them the necessary principles of the conduct to be pursued in society, which can be recapitulated in the axiom "Not to do unto others what we would not have them do unto us," and conversely. Of all the agents of education outside of the family and the school, the most active without doubt are the books and the journals which one takes, not for instruction but for distraction. But under what various aspects are these not presented? What wonderful services might they not accomplish in the hands of men who had the true sense and feeling for the beneficence that could be spread by them. They could habituate people to sound and comforting ideas ; they could set the example of the morals which it should be desirous to establish ; they could elevate the heart and the mind and facilitate the task of the wise, who see afar. But in general their action is the reverse. I dare not say what the state of affairs in the United States is in this regard, but here where I am writing, the picture is a sad one. The good is eclipsed by the evil ; the liberty of writing and of publishing is one of the conquests of modern times, but in the stage which it has

now reached it is merely an unnamable licence. The most shameful novels, which show the human species only in its basest aspects, and which glorify vice, are in all hands, and especially among the lower classes to whom they are furnished for a mere nothing. With certain reviews and journals they contribute more than any other cause to the increase of the number of criminals, and especially of young criminals. In order to sell, these journals shrink before nothing; they exalt the passions, openly cultivate scandal, preach insubordination, and crush the holiest and most useful sentiments under foot. The press should be the great educator; it is the great demoraliser. If any example of the contradiction between the principles, or rather the desires, and reality is conspicuous, it is assuredly here. On the one hand it is desired that the individual should enjoy all his liberties, although the very essence of life in common is the restriction of those liberties. On the other hand people seem to regard it as their duty to furnish the proof that unlimited liberty is impossible. There is no middle course. The press, the novel writers, and the pamphleteers must understand that their mission is to encourage the development of the necessary morals, or that they must be prepared for being repressed.

In the third instance, come the laws and institutions which best foster the customs and habits which it is desirous to develop, and the modes of feeling and thinking which it is desirous to arouse. The state should be strict with those under its care, but also strict with itself, and should give the first example of the virtues which it exacts. The individual responsibility of each of its employees, whatever their rank, should be absolute for every undertaking, for every infraction of the prescribed forms. The slightest failing on the part of the state throws trouble into the souls of individuals and authorises them to revolt. Everywhere, in the bureaux, in the tribunals, in its diplomatic service, it should be impeccable. But so long as war persists with its perverted ethics, there can be no hope of an absolute transformation of the public mind. The numerous and flagrant mistakes which are sometimes committed in the name of justice and for reasons of state, which authorise everything and anything, have pernicious results.

In the last instance come the efforts of private persons and of associations which are animated by a profound love of humanity,—the efforts of practical philanthropists, of philosophers striving to elaborate systems of conduct, and of scientists coldly analysing the difficulties of the problem. Here is the place to ask whether in order to give unity to all these efforts, the time is not ripe for establishing a code of morals concerning certain indispensable points regarding which the whole world is in accord.

We have seen how little a man amounts to in time and in space, in the hands of an irresistible nature which crushes him despite the fact that he has found a way to adapt some of her forces to his needs ; how intensely he desires to live as fully and agreeably as possible while perpetuating his species, although as an individual his foresight reaches hardly beyond his children and grandchildren. We have seen, on the other hand, that society has adopted for its controlling principles not absolute truths but relative and necessary truths in order to fulfil the end for which it exists, and to enable individuals to live wisely and conformably to their desires ; that among the principles of solidarity, liberty, equality, fraternity, and justice, none of them can withstand rigorous examination. Society is a solidarity of interests, and not a real solidarity ; the basis of society is the restriction of liberty ; equality does not exist among men nor in the results of their conduct ; fraternity is but disguised egoism. In social practice these principles amount to this—solidarity, but psychical only ; equality, but only before the law ; fraternity, but only as a dream. Yet one of them dominates all the others,—justice, an imitation of relative and individual justice, and the synonym of “giving to every one what is his due.” Solidarity, in fact, implies justice ; the restriction of liberty implies justice ; justice implies equality ; without justice there is no fraternity. Justice thus becomes the primal necessity *par excellence*, the postulate¹ of any system of life in common. Justice is our supreme desire, the ideal of which we dream in spite of all proof to the contrary, that

¹ “Any truth is called a postulate, which although not rigorously demonstrable must yet become practically admitted because of the necessity of its consequences.” —Paul Janet, *op. cit.*

which we say must be, that which we are bound to create and establish in spite of all, and in the face of all, of which we must be convinced and which must be taken as an article of faith.

It is justice therefore with which the necessary moral code which is to be enacted must in the first instance be saturated,—the commandments of society which are to be prescribed for the family and for the schools, notably for the primary schools.¹

But, it will be said, this code of morals and these principles, these habits or instincts impressed upon the unconscious ego, consolidated with time and sanctioned by the punishment which the laws prescribe,—will they be sufficient to assure in all circumstances the conduct desired? Should there not be sought in the individual organism itself, in its cerebral system, some influence which would act from this side on the unconscious ego and move it in the direction which society deems best,—in the direction of what is called the good?

The first influence to be invoked would be the categorical imperative of Kant. And without a thought of this and by ways which Kant would doubtless have rejected, it is precisely to this idea that we ultimately come. The individual feels with the sentiments and the ideas of his ancestors. These ideas deserve the qualification of innate. He acts with the habits which these ancestors have handed down to him and which education has confirmed. His animal ego reflects what the acquired ego has gained; he no longer knows whether he acts automatically or by his own initiative, and he adopts the good or evil as society wishes.

The second is that expounded by M. Guyau in his different works,² and which I shall paraphrase as follows: life which has reached the last stage of its evolution in the organic series, which has arrived at the point where it is aware of itself (consciousness), where it admires itself and everything about it (the æsthetic sense),

¹ See Paul Janet, *Éléments de morale pratique. Enseignement secondaire moderne conforme aux programmes officiels de 1891*. Paris, 1897. I take exception to Chapter X. only.

² M. Guyau, *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction*, Paris, 1892; *L'irreligion de l'avenir*, Paris, 1896; *Vers d'un philosophe*, Paris, 1896, etc.

where it diffuses itself over others (the moral or altruistic social sense), even over ideal beings (the religious sense). "Life, the most extensive and intensive possible, conscious of its fecundity," he says somewhere. "To live the maximum of life," he says again, "in the most varied manner possible and to cause that life to overflow upon others, is the end and the cause of our acts, and not the pleasure which we derive from them." It is the need of activity inherent in every organ, in every organism, and especially in the brain, of which I have frequently spoken, but the consecration of which, I add in opposition to Guyau, lies in the pleasure which this activity offers of itself. The objection is this. It is a power of expansion and not a guide to conduct in a determinate sense, useful to all. It is perfect in people like Guyau, a poet and a philosopher, who find happiness in the exercise of their highest intellectual faculties, but it is inefficacious in that other class of persons, and these are the great majority, who place their ideal in satisfactions of a different order. On this theory one can be a villain, a Napoleon, or a Rothschild.

The third influence is self-respect, human dignity, belief in one's superiority,—in a word, pride. Man, recognising his dependence, proudly and haughtily refuses to accept as the judge of his conduct any one but himself. This is stoicism in its general form. It is excellent for inspiring courage and for enduring undeserved adversity, but it is insufficient to arouse that generosity and tolerance which are factors of the conduct desired by society.

The fourth, which is derived from the two preceding, is the will which flows from liberty as it is understood by M. A. Fouillée. I shall recapitulate its main terms: "It is a characteristic of man that he is moved not by purely physical forces or blind instincts, but by ideas." "Ideas are forces which influence our conduct by the very fact of their conception." They are at once the cause and the end. "The evolution of nature can have no preconceived end, in the proper sense of the word, but the evolution of humanity has one, from the fact that humanity actually sets itself an aim, and imposes upon itself an ideal to be realised." "The idea of a society adopting liberty, equality, and fraternity as its end is the

highest moral ideal." To will is to be able. "Ideal liberty is a power of indefinite development, the essence of which consists in the power to throw off selfishness and to love, and the progressive realisation of which would lead to moral and social union among living beings." I confine myself to two remarks. Ideas conceived as moving springs of conduct are precisely those spontaneous impulses which I desire to create by education and heredity. Liberty implies the power of showing oneself unselfish, but in the same measure the power of considering everything in the light of one's interests.

The fifth influence is the prudent interest of Bentham and John Stuart Mill, by virtue of which the individual through careful reasoning identifies his personal welfare with the welfare of all. It is virtually the end to which the system that I have developed tends, save that I would replace the words "by careful reasoning" by the word "unconsciously." In fact, intelligence varies. Secondly, intelligence may in many circumstances, and precisely in those in which the unreflecting impulse is the most necessary, come to the conclusion that the interest of the individual is opposed to the social interest. In my system, on the other hand, the individual acts unconsciously in the direction required, for the simple reason that he has the habit of so doing.

A sixth influence is that physiological property on which we have so often insisted, which is highly developed in the majority of animals, particularly in herbivorous and domestic animals, and not less developed in man in the state of nature before the struggle with his fellow-beings broke forth and had not assumed in society so threatening a form. We are speaking of that species of cerebral sensibility which moves both man and animals to seek the company of their congeners, to derive satisfaction from their mutual relations, to love others, and to desire to be loved by others. It is altruism, of which the first stage is kindness and the last devotion; the most powerful physiological impulse next to egoism, although it is only an indirect form of egoism. To love and to be loved, next to eating, drinking, and acting is the first need of children. It remains intense to the age of puberty, and continues to the day

when the individual enters into the arena of serious life. In the old man who has no longer any of the cares of existence, it resumes its rights and spreads over his grandchildren. In the adult, in the moments of respite which the struggle leaves him, it is his repose, refuge, and recompense. How sad life would be without friendships! In the bosom of his family the wife satisfies the needs of the heart rather than those of the senses. The husband, who is less faithful in the second regard, is loyal as to the first. Man undoubtedly domesticated the dog by altruism, and every day we see him creating bonds of attachment to himself in the most different kind of animals, by simply asking for reciprocity. Altruism is the first source of sociability, as we have already demonstrated, and it is its consecration under its multiple forms of kindness, indulgence, tolerance, self-denial, sympathy, charity, generosity, devotion. This is the reason why, in spite of all the objections which may be raised to assisting the unfortunate, no voice is ever raised against it, and that there is no difference of opinion except as to the means. It is the only physiological force which can check in the organism itself the impulses of egoism and the many secondary forms which egoism assumes. To adopt reason as the instrument for combating personal interest after the fashion of Bentham, is to exaggerate its power. To adopt human vanity, liberty, or fear, is still more exaggerating it. The system of Guyau accords best with that of altruism, for to live in the happiness of others as much as in one's own, to exchange impressions, sentiments, and thoughts, is to live with greater fulness, and to see about one nature in all its smiles and beauties. Justice is a necessary regulator of social life; external equality which society offers is its corollary. The maximum possible liberty is the individual principle that comes next, and let us add to the latter, the principle of fraternity formulated by the Master, "Love ye one another."

With these two elements, altruism as the basis, and habits and social instincts as the means of execution, the desired end will be attained. The conditions to be sought, the reforms to be made, the new things to be added, are they not precisely what we see has been spontaneously effected in our best and most esteemed fam-

ilies? What, in the last instance, are the best of us, individually, if not the product of the transmission of virtues which our ancestors have bequeathed to us, despite our tendency to create other habits for ourselves, to wrest ourselves from the bonds of heredity, and to build up in ourselves independent originality? The good instincts which we may have, do we obtain them from the spirit of the century, from the cold reasoning of the day, which analyses the motives and the effects of all acts, and mathematically calculates its interests? No, we receive them from our predecessors. We are honest, proper, and loving because our fathers and grandfathers were so. Otherwise, how can the naturalist and the freethinker explain the flagrant contradiction which exists between his conduct and his reasoning. He sees only brute reality, he establishes the sad truth, he deduces the consequences of it, and yet he is unable to free himself from the most generous aspirations of his altruism. He places friendship in the front rank and practises it. Why? Because the soul of his ancestors is perpetuated in him, because he is their continuation. Yves Guyot, who professes egoism as the sole principle of individual conduct in society, writes as follows: "When I see a child beaten, and hear it cry, when I see a woman weeping, when I am the witness of suffering, I am divided into two persons. Another ego feels these pains. . . . All my fibres are set in vibration; the old blood of the soldier, the corsair, the hunter, which runs in my veins, seethes within me. . . . My instincts impel me to act." He speaks truly. It is no longer the egoist who is talking, but the altruist by heredity.

The establishing, or re-establishing, of the customs which are best adapted to social happiness and their progressive consolidation by heredity; the ego, without name, acting automatically in the direction which society deems to be the best; the individual and society, shaped by man as he shapes a plant or an animal conformably to his needs, justice as the regulator, and love as the ideal: such, in fine, is our system.

Is it necessary to add to this a grain of mysticism—a belief in the absolute, a belief in the individual surviving the body and preserving its memory? Or the transformation of the categorical im-

perative in the form which we have stated it, into a metaphysical entity? We do not believe that the system would gain by such an addition. It would be a dogma simply. It is true that justice, as we have shown in the case of society, deserves in some measure this name, and that liberty is not much farther removed from it. The essential thing is to attain the end, the greatest possible happiness. But is not illusion frequently happiness? Is it not often more beautiful and more consoling than reality? Read the heart-breaking pages of Guyau,¹ dying and still not abandoning hope. Would it not have been cruel to deprive him of it?

Certainly, but to admit illusion, even in the extremest case, would be tantamount to declaring that truth is insufficient, that there is no remedy whatever, and that human reason culminates in lamentable fallibility. But we have not reached this point. Truth, when we look it calmly and stoically in the face, is not so discouraging. Herbert Spencer, who concludes as we do as regards the necessity of developing altruism and certain hereditary habits, is wrong in his expressions of despair at the close of his monumental work. We differ from him in the point that he counts upon the free play of individuals and natural evolution, whereas we believe it indispensable that man should direct his own evolution. We, too, have had our moments of doubt,—not regarding the efficacy of our system, but regarding the possibility of realising it without the intervention of too much authority; but we have taken fresh confidence. We believe unqualifiedly in the great power of heredity, habit, and unconscious impulse over our daily acts. We are convinced that if society so desires it and comports itself properly, it can in a few generations transform sentiments and manners, and adapt them to its needs. The useful instincts have sprung up of themselves in animals. Why may they not, with the assistance of reason, be created in man? Speaking only of France, I have already seen about me for the last ten years, certain indications pointing to renovation; new social classes will achieve success where the old have failed. No doubt there will be storms, good

¹ Pp. 26-28 of his *Esquisse d'une morale*.

and evil alternations, but in the end evolution, which proceeds only by oscillations and starts, will enter on the right path. Let us not despair. Man is too powerful to fail in reaching his end. The golden age of humanity is ahead of us, the sun of the twentieth century will be that of truth. "Error is a Penelope who, without wishing to do so, is incessantly unravelling the texture which she has woven. Truth, on the other hand, in the struggle of ideas for life, will sooner or later bear off the victory." (Fouillée.)¹

Let us revert, as we near the close, to the question of the functions of the state,—first the essential functions which it cannot possibly cast off, and secondly the facultative functions, including one of the highest importance, that which concerns progress, or more exactly the best adaptation of things to men and of men to things. It may be summed up as follows :

The state is responsible for the existence of society without and within. To this end it is armed with all powers and uses them

¹The article of Professor Dewey in *The Monist* for April, 1898, and that of Dr. Paul Carus in *The Monist* for April, 1894, on the *Evolution and Ethics* of the late lamented Professor Huxley, have just drawn my attention to Vol. IX. of the *Collected Essays* of this author. I was much struck with the identity of my conclusions with those of Professor Huxley, published in 1888, 1893, and 1894. I am not astonished at the fact, however ; for, proceeding by the same methods, and with the same facts and in the same spirit, we ought necessarily to have reached the same result. I call attention to some few of the propositions.

"Social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step, and the substitution for it of another which may be called the ethical process."

The science of ethics or morals is that of the best conduct for the individual and society. The morally good is what answers best to the general good of the community, all other things being equal.

Social progress is effected, not by self-assertion (my "free expansion of life" in the individual, Guyau's "need of living at the maximum"), but by self-restraint and self-discipline.

"The intelligence which converted the brother of the wolf into a faithful guardian of the flock ought to be able to do something toward curbing the instincts of savagery in civilised man."

Huxley does not formally indicate the ethical process which I set up ; namely, the moulding of the acquired and unconscious ego to conform to the needs of society ; but it follows implicitly from numerous passages of his on habits, reflex actions, heredity, etc. We find, in fact, that there is no choice ; either we have to abandon ourselves to the *laissez faire*, which is nothing but the cosmic process itself and can only lead to anarchy and the rule of the strongest ; or, we must, by taking our stand on the nature of man, *direct* the ethical process, as I have explained.

as it sees necessary. It is entrusted, further, with its prosperity, present and future, and its guidance is limited here by the laws, which it is as much bound to obey as private persons are. These laws change with the legislature, and the question recurs: What is the scope of power that should be accorded to it? Should they be augmented or curtailed? Should more be given to the state and less to the individual, or conversely?

It is here that the difference of opinion of statesmen, economists, and sociologists appear. There are extremists on both sides. On the one hand are the collectivists who wish to lodge every possible power in the state, to revert to the communal or national form of property existing in the majority of primitive societies, to regulate the entire current of life, to give to each according to his needs strictly considered, and not according to his labors,—in short, to suppress individual responsibility. On the other side there are the anarchists who refuse to consider the least restriction of natural liberty, who attack thus the very principles of society and go so far as to say that wherever three men are assembled there is a tyrant. Neither the one nor the other of these systems deserves to be discussed. It is certain that the time has come, that there are many reforms to be made, that all have not their equal share of the means for administering to their needs and for becoming established in life, but the difficulties cannot be solved by exaggerations which are at downright variance with practice. Between the two extremes are the advocates of authority who believe in a strong state thoroughly centralised, but a state which grants to the individual sufficient liberty to enable him to move freely in the sphere of his personal affairs; while there are also the radicals who are for decentralisation, who would give the maximum of liberty to the individual without going to the extreme of the anarchist, but who are too hasty to be practical.

In the centre are the progressivists whose name is perfect and who also deserve the name of opportunists, as they are called in France. For us they are the sages of Plato, those who know how to put to use the teachings of social science according as it is de-

veloped, those upon whom I would count for directing the social evolution in the direction and by the means which I have sketched.

It is from social science, the most important of the applications of anthropology, of which sociology is a branch, that all light is destined to come. Born of yesterday, it already bears testimony to its sweeping influence. Its program is clear: to classify the ends in view; to look the difficulties courageously in the face even where unsurmountable; to establish principles; to seek to reconcile the contradictions which we have instanced between the conceptions and desires of man and the realities of nature; to suffer every progress to come to its maturity; to proceed without prejudice, without theory, with a full knowledge that the absolute good cannot be realised, but only a relative and progressive better. The developments which we have been following in this long work reveal our tendencies at the points where we have not indicated them. For us, the individual, the family, and personal property are the social tripod. For us, the political formula is as follows: the maximum possible to the individual, the minimum possible to the state, and in the latter the most possible to the local authorities, the least possible but the necessary to the central authorities. If I am not mistaken this is the condition that exists in the United States.

* * *

We have reached the conclusion of our long work which we had entitled "Science and Faith." We have spoken much of the one and very little of the other. The reason is that the two mutually exclude each other. Science is knowledge; faith is belief. Science considers things objectively and accepts only what is demonstrated by observations, *perpendæ et numerandæ*, and by generalisations and inductions which go with it, stopping at agnosticism.¹ Faith, on the contrary, is subjective, individual, and dependent on cerebral sensibility, as the latter has been constituted by heredity, education, habits, and temperament of the subject. Orators, who like the celebrated Dominican, Père Didon, seek to demonstrate

¹ That is, stopping where the facts abandon us, not having recourse to a world where no positive and objective facts are forthcoming.

the compatibility of the truths established by science and the beliefs dictated by faith, only shatter the latter ; a faith which is examined and shown to be in accord with facts ceases to be faith. It is warrantable that in the epoch of humanity in which we are at present, there is utility in extolling certain articles of faith, as Kant has done. It is quite warrantable that certain philosophical doctrines are advocated ; and one cannot admire too much the sages who thus devote themselves to the mission of work for humanity. I am not far even from admitting that the four or five principles, especially justice, which society takes for its base and ideal, should be converted into articles of faith, but I would have it perfectly understood that the two domains of science and faith are totally different—are two contrary poles.¹

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¹ I have been much struck with the religiosity, excessive but perhaps necessary in its excess, of the English and the North Americans, joined to a calculating, free, and well-balanced psychological state, which I appreciate all the more highly because if I am not mistaken it is the same that governs my own ideas. This religiosity was principally formed some *centuries ago* with the Puritans and the Presbyterians of Scotland. Nevertheless, as an anthropologist, I believe that this placid religiosity, which is so different from that of the dark populations, goes back to very remote times and is one of the distinctive traits of the blond races. For proof, witness the religion of the Druids, of the prehistoric Gauls (I speak of the tall, dolichocephalic and blond Gauls, and not of the brachycephalic Celts), the congeners of the Cambrians, British, Danes, and so forth.